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The notion that learning and knowledge are socially constructed in organizations seems to 
be gaining ground in the literature (and in particular in this conference volume). These gains c 
be traced to two related theoretical developments. The first development pertains to a concep-
tual shift from an individual to a social perspective on organizational learning (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2004). Individual learning refers to an inner mental process through which in-
formation and knowledge are acquired and processed. It is a predominantly cognitive process, 
directed at the enhancement of the mental models (or cognitive structures) guiding behavior. 
Social learning refers to a process in which knowledge acquisition is situated and grounded in 
interaction, activity and practice in everyday organizational life and work. The emphasis is 
not so much on knowledge (cognitive, facts and skills), but on knowing (behavioral, some-
thing we do)( Elkjaer, 2003; Vera & Crossan, 2003). 
The second development pertains to a conceptual shift from a content to a relational per-
spective on knowledge. Authors from the content perspective regard knowledge as a mental 
commodity that can be codified and stored in systems and exchanged between individuals and 
individuals and systems (e.g., Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Gallupe, 
2001; Nonaka, 1991; 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Authors from the relational perspec-
tive regard knowledge as a relative, provisional and context-bound phenomenon, with a focus 
on the processes of knowing and acting. Knowledge is socially embedded in communities and 
intimately tied to day-to-day practice (e.g., Blackler, 1995; Bogenrieder & Nooteboom, 2004; 
Breu & Hemingway, 2002; Hayes & Walsham, 2003; Huysman, 2004; Plaskoff, 2003). 
Authors from the social and relational perspectives have sometimes criticized the individ-
ual and content approaches for vagueness of their definitions, their weak empirical base and 
prescriptive standpoints (e.g., Alvesson & Kårreman, 2001; Hayes & Walsham, 2003; Tsou-
kas & Vladimirou, 2001). Yet the social and relational perspectives themselves cannot fully 
escape similar critiques. What exactly does take place when knowledge is being socially con-
structed in organizations? How do we distinguish learning from acting and interacting? What 
exactly constitutes the relational nature of knowledge? What seems to be missing in these per-
spectives is a theory of communication and interaction with which to approach such ques-
tions. 
In this working paper I propose an interactional perspective on knowledge and learning 
that intends to shed more light on the processes underlying the social construction and the 
situated, relational nature of knowledge. Grounded in the work of the Palo Alto schools on 
learning and communication (e.g., Bateson, 1958; 1972; 1979; Haley, 1963; Ruesch & Bate-
son, 1951; Watzlawick et al., 1967) and based on my earlier work in these areas (Visser, 
2003ab; 2004), learning and knowing are viewed in terms of behavioral interaction at the 
level of context and relationship. 
To develop this perspective, I first distinguish between three orders of knowledge and 
learning. Second, I discuss pathologies in learning and double binds and show their implica-
tions for organizational knowledge construction. Finally, the paper is summarized and conclu-
sions are drawn. Throughout this paper, I will use the well-known experiment of the ‘neurotic 
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dog’ to make my concepts clear at a relatively simple, straight forward level. Further, I define 
learning as the process of acquiring knowledge, following a tentative definition by Easterby-
Smith & Lyles (2003: 3). 
Three orders of knowledge and learning 
In a classical salivary conditioning experiment, a dog is trained to respond differentially to 
two stimuli, a circle and an ellipse. The appearance of the circle is repeatedly accompanied by 
food. After several pairings of food and circle, the dog learns to salivate in response to the 
circle alone. The appearance of the ellipse is not accompanied by food. Consequently, the dog 
learns not to salivate in response to the ellipse alone. When the dog sufficiently has been con-
ditioned to discriminate between the conditioned stimuli, the task is slowly made more diffi-
cult. In consecutive trials the experimenter gradually reduces the contrast between the stimuli 
by making the ellipse somewhat fatter and the circle somewhat flatter, until the ratio of the 
semi-axes in the ellipse reaches 9:8. After three weeks of working on this differentiation, the 
dog increasingly fails to discriminate between the two forms. At the same time it starts to ex-
hibit symptoms of severe disturbance (like violently barking and squealing, biting its keeper, 
refusing food, becoming disobedient, etc.). When the contrast between the stimuli is increased 
again, the dog gradually becomes quieter and returns to its normal state. When subsequently 
the contrast between the stimuli is reduced again to 9:8, the dog again starts to exhibit symp-
toms of disturbance (Pavlov, 1927: 289-293). 
To account for knowledge acquisition and learning in this experiment, I propose a distinc-
tion between three orders of knowledge, which correspond to three orders of learning (Bate-
son, 1972; 1979; 1996/1971; Watzlawick et al., 1967). The reader should note that this is an 
analytical distinction of learning process occurring concomitantly: 
(1) The dog acquires knowledge of things: it becomes aware of the objects circle and el-
lipse through his senses. Acquiring this knowledge corresponds to zero-learning. It in-
volves the simple receipt of a signal, not subject to correction by earlier experience. 
Following this, one can speak of zero-order knowledge.  
(2) The dog acquires knowledge about the objects circle and ellipse, their relationship to 
the occurrence of instances of reinforcement and punishment, and thus their impor-
tance for his survival. Acquiring this knowledge corresponds to proto-learning. The 
dog learns to respond to the experimental contingencies of reinforcement, i.e. to adapt 
his behavior to instances of reinforcement and punishment. Following this, one can 
speak of first-order knowledge. 
(3) The dog acquires knowledge about the context in which the objects and his responses 
become related. Acquiring this knowledge corresponds to deutero-learning. The dog 
learns about characteristic patterns of contingency, or contexts of conditioning, in his 
relationship to the experimenter and the laboratory environment in which the experi-
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ments take place. In other words, the dog learns to (proto-) learn. Following this, one 
can speak of second-order knowledge. 
For humans (and arguably, for dogs as well) the acquisition of zero-order knowledge alone 
is very rare. It would amount to a perception for which no explanation from past experience 
or present context is available, producing a world of merely unexplainable, uncontrollable and 
unpredictable events and objects which would be quite anxiety-producing (Mineka & 
Kihlstrom, 1978; Watzlawick et al., 1967).  
First- and second-order knowledge is commonly acquired by humans in continuous inter-
action with physical and social objects in their environment. From this interaction, humans 
develop an awareness of contexts of consequences and a habit of responding to future con-
texts. For example, a person who (like Pavlov’s dog) is reared under or subjected to a pro-
longed situation of classic conditioning will increasingly expect contexts in which signs of fu-
ture reinforcements can be detected, but nothing can be done to influence the occurrence of 
reinforcement. In mental terms such a person is likely to adopt an attitude of fatalism. This 
experience with earlier contingency patterns leads to a habit of acting as if all new contexts 
exhibit the same pattern. The habit of expecting a certain pattern of events in its turn tends to 
become self-validating by promoting certain behaviors and by discouraging others. The fatal-
istic person who behaves passively and waits silently for things to happen fulfills his own ex-
pectations (Bateson, 1958; 1963). 
Mental characteristics like awareness, habit, experience and attitude do not exist in a social 
vacuum. These characteristics can always be redefined in terms of a relation between a person 
and somebody or something else. In relational transactions there are contexts of proto-
learning that bring about the deutero-learning to which the mental characteristic refers. Here 
stimuli, responses and reinforcements acquire meaning in contingency patterns of inter-
change. These patterns are defined by the participants as characteristics of their relation, de-
pending upon their subjective patterning of events. For example, when in ongoing interchange 
person A as a rule provides positive reinforcements in response to the stimuli, provided by 
person B, one could characterize the relationship between A and B in terms of supporting and 
leaning (Bateson, 1963; 1972; Bateson & Jackson, 1968). 
In human relations, contexts of proto-learning are introduced in two ways. First, a mes-
sage, sent by one person, sets the context for a certain class of response by the other person. 
Second, non-verbal signs (like tone of voice, facial expression, gestures and bodily posture) 
function as a context marker of the verbal message, therefore as a ‘context of context’ for the 
other person. This setting of contexts is inevitable in interpersonal exchange, since in interac-
tion the categories stimulus, response and reinforcement are never ‘empty.’ All behavior (ver-
bal and non-verbal) occurring between persons who are conscious of each other’s presence 
has behavioral effects, whether intended or not. Such effects have interpersonal message 
value, and therefore are communicative in nature. Since for humans it is impossible not to be-
have in one way or the other, it follows that in interaction it is impossible not to communicate 
(Bateson, 1963; Haley, 1963; Watzlawick et al., 1967). 
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When applied to organizations, the social construction of knowledge predominantly per-
tains to second-order knowledge. It is acquired through deutero-learning, the learning of char-
acteristic patterns of contingency in an organizational context. Such learning is intimately tied 
to behavioral interaction and communication. In an organizational context, all behavior that is 
emitted in the presence of others has effects on those others, intended or unintended. Those 
effects, describable in proto-learning terms as reinforcing or punishing consequences, are mu-
tual and continuous. At the same time members deutero-learn: they come to discern regulari-
ties or patterns in the numerous consequences they experience in the course of their working 
days and they come to behave accordingly. The knowledge they thus acquire is inherently re-
lational, i.e. tied to transactions with their social and physical environment. 
Double binds 
The ‘neurotic dog’ experiment implies that, from an interactional perspective, learning and 
knowledge acquisition are by no means unproblematic. Bateson has interpreted the disturbed 
behavior of the dog as pathological deutero-learning. In the beginning of the experiment the 
dog deutero-learns that it acts in a context for discrimination. The whole experimental setup, 
the laboratory situation and the course of the experiment contains numerous context markers 
for this discrimination purpose. At the point when discrimination becomes impossible, these 
markers become misleading. At once the animal enters a context in which it no longer should 
show discrimination, but instead should resort to guesswork and gambling. Obviously, the 
dog is not able to adapt to this sudden breach of contexts. Bateson has supported this interpre-
tation with two observations from other animal experiments. First, dogs that are not trained in 
discrimination do not show signs of disturbance when randomly confronted with slightly dif-
ferent ellipses and circles. Second, when similar experiments are conducted outside the labo-
ratory, the dogs fail to develop these symptoms. Bateson concluded that the ‘neurotic dog’ is 
being put in the wrong at the deutero-learning level. In other words, it is placed in a double 
bind situation (Bateson, 1972; 1979; 1996/1971; Ruesch & Bateson, 1951; Watzlawick et al., 
1967). 
The double bind situation has four interdependent and jointly operative characteristics 
(Bateson, 1972; Visser, 2003a):  
(1) Two or more communicants are involved in an intense relationship with a high 
(physical or psychological) survival value for at least one of them. For example, in the 
experiment the dog is critically dependent upon the experimenter for food, shelter, at-
tention and affection. 
(2) In this relationship incongruent messages are regularly given that at one level assert 
something, but at another other level negate or conflict with this assertion. The first 
message often takes the form of a negative injunction, threatening some behavior with 
punishment. The second message conflicts with the first at one or more points and is 
also enforced by punishments or signals that threaten survival. For example, in the ex-
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periment the presence of the circle signals the occurrence of reinforcement to the dog, 
while the presence of the ellipse signals punishment (i.e. the absence of reinforce-
ment). When circle and ellipse come to resemble each other too much, the resulting 
stimulus signals an incongruent message that threatens the basis of reinforcement of 
the dog. 
(3) In this relation the receiver of the incongruent messages is prevented from withdraw-
ing from the situation or commenting on it. The receiver may be prohibited from es-
caping the field or (s)he may not have learned on which level of communication to re-
spond. For example, in the experiment the dog is kept in a leather harness during the 
experiments that drastically curtails its freedom of movement and permits no escape 
from aversive stimuli. 
(4) Double binding in this sense is a long lasting characteristic of the situation, which, 
once established, tends toward self-perpetuation. For example, in the experiment the 
dog remains highly sensitive to the 9:8 stimulus when shown after the experiments. 
The social construction of knowledge in organizations may be subject to comparable dou-
ble bind characteristics, which foster pathological deutero-learning and may induce stress and 
anxiety in organization members, comparable to Pavlov’s dog. In the sparse research on dou-
ble binds in organizations, the four characteristics have been applied as follows: 
Ad (1): The ‘intensity’ of the relationship has been related to the degree of psychological 
identification members feel toward their organizations and work. Members who 
feel highly attached to their organizations and work experience more stress and 
anxiety in a double bind situation than members who feel less or not attached 
(Tracy, 2004). The ‘survival value’ of the relationship has been related to hierar-
chical dependency in organizations. Members who feel more dependent on man-
agement experience more stress and anxiety in a double bind situation than mem-
bers who feel less dependent (Dopson & Neumann, 1998; Steier, 1995). 
Ad (2): The ‘incongruent communication’ and ‘threats of punishment’ have not been re-
searched in organizations. However, in psychological experiments in which sub-
jects have been exposed to incongruent communication in an atmosphere of pun-
ishment, a significant amount of stress and anxiety has been measured in those 
subjects. It may be supposed that organizations members who repeatedly are ex-
posed to these two factors experience more stress and anxiety in a double bind 
situation than members who are less or not exposed to these factors (e.g., Bowers 
& Sanders, 1974; Dush & Brodsky, 1981; Smith, 1976). 
Ad (3): Being ‘prevented from withdrawing from the situation’ has been related to the per-
sonal and financial status and benefits members receive from their organizations 
and to their beliefs that other organizations will not provide equal status and bene-
fits, or worse, to fears of being fired and becoming unemployed. Members who 
perceive a high negative difference between current status and benefits and possi-
ble future status and benefits experience more stress and anxiety in a double bind 
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situation than members who feel a negative or no difference in this respect 
(Dopson & Neumann, 1998). Being ‘prevented from commenting on the situation’ 
has been related to the ‘total institution’ atmosphere of organizations that deal with 
life-death emergencies and emotionally intense problems (examples are prisons, 
correctional facilities, police, armed forces, hospitals, mental institutions, secret 
services and fire departments). The large difference in emotional intensity between 
life inside and outside such organizations, the necessity of strong unit cohesion and 
clear leadership in recurrent emergency situations, the classified nature of some 
activities all limit the possibilities of meta-communication inside and outside these 
organizations. Members who are exposed to a strong ‘total institution’ atmosphere 
experience more stress and anxiety in a double bind situation than members ex-
posed to a less pronounced ‘total institution’ atmosphere (Tracy, 2004). 
Ad (4): The ‘long lasting’ characteristic of the double bind has been found to be less es-
sential, even when some other aggravating conditions were present. The stress and 
anxiety in the experiments, mentioned under (2), occurred in spite of the relatively 
short period, the transient nature of the subjects’ relation to the experimenter and 
the relatively lenient nature of the punishments involved. Thus in experiments this 
characteristic has been only modestly present, arguably less so than in many or-
ganizations (as the results of Dopson & Neumann and Tracy suggest). 
Summary & conclusions 
In the current literature a conceptual shift is discernible from an individual to a social per-
spective on organizational learning and from a content to a relational perspective on knowl-
edge. Learning and knowledge increasingly are regarded as socially constructed in organiza-
tions. In this working paper I have outlined an interactional perspective that intends to shed 
more light on the processes underlying the social construction and the situated, relational na-
ture of knowledge. Conceptually, the knowledge that is socially constructed in organizations 
is regarded as second-order knowledge, acquired through deutero-learning. Learning and 
knowledge of these kinds are inherently relational, i.e. intimately tied to behavioral interac-
tion and communication with the social and physical context in organizations. Under certain 
conditions learning and knowledge of these kinds may lead to a double bind situation, which 
may induce stress and anxiety in organizational members. 
The added theoretical value of this interactional perspective seems to lie in two specific no-
tions. First, it adds the notion of the ‘impossibility of not communicating’. This notion points 
at the significance of all forms of social interaction between organizational members who are 
aware of each others’ presence. Noting that second-order knowledge is acquired in social con-
texts, one could extend this notion and propose the ‘impossibility of not constructing knowl-
edge socially’ in organizations. Such knowledge is intimately tied to relationships and to the 
mutually exchanged verbal and non-verbal behaviors that constitute these relationships. Sec-
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ond, it adds the notion that learning and knowledge are not necessarily positive or neutral 
phenomena. Under double bind conditions, the social construction of knowledge may become 
pathological, leaving the organization and its members increasingly maladjusted to environ-
mental contingencies. More generally, the interactional perspective provides additional theo-
retical clues as to how interpretations of reality are formed in interaction and how pathologies 
in interpretation are formed and maintained in organizations. 
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